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Abstract 
Economic theory predicts an indeterminate (positive or inverse) relationship between financial 
inclusion and income inequality. We invoke a panel threshold model to investigate the 
possibility of a non-linear relationship between financial inclusion and income inequality, 
covering 106 countries. Our results show that financial inclusion reduces income inequality, 
but only up to a point, beyond which it does not reduce, and may even increase, inequality. 
Moreover, the effects of financial inclusion on the distribution of income vary across 
heterogeneous financial services and across countries at different stages of economic 
development. 
 
Keywords: Financial inclusion; income inequality; panel threshold model 
JEL classification: G2; F4; O5.  
 
1. Introduction 
The question of whether financial inclusion reduces income inequality has received 
increasing attention in the economics and finance literature in recent years. However, economic 
theory still provides conflicting predictions about the relationship between financial inclusion 
and inequality. Some theoretical models (e.g., Galor and Zeira, 1993) suggest a negative linear 
relationship between access to credit and income inequality. In contrast, Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) predict a non-linear, inverted U-shaped relationship, between access to 
financial services and inequality, while Dabla-Norris et al. (2020) suggest that some financial 
inclusion policies may reduce or even increase inequality. The few existing empirical studies 
on this issue yield conflicting findings. Some studies find a negative relationship between 
 
*We acknowledge, without implication, financial support from the DEGRP Research Grant (ES/N013344/2), funded by DFID 
and ESRC, on “Delivering Inclusive Financial Development and Growth”, the ESRC-NSFC (ES/P005241/1) Research Grant 
on “Developing financial systems to support sustainable growth in China – The role of innovation, diversity and financial 
regulation”, and the AXA Research Fund. 
 
2 
 
financial inclusion and income inequality (e.g., Honohan, 2007; Aslan et al., 2017), while 
recent cross-country evidence remains inconclusive (e.g., Park and Mercado, 2018; Dabla-
Norris et al. 2020). 
We make three contributions to the financial inclusion-income inequality literature. 
Firstly, we employ a panel threshold regression model to investigate possible non-linear effects 
of financial inclusion on income inequality in a panel of 106 countries over 2011, 2014 and 
2017. We argue that the effects of financial inclusion on inequality may vary with the level of 
financial inclusion. Secondly, we examine whether the effects of financial inclusion on the 
distribution of incomes differ across different dimensions of financial inclusion (i.e., access 
and use) and across heterogeneous financial services (i.e., account ownership and credit). 
Thirdly, we explore the possibility that the relationship between financial inclusion and income 
inequality varies across countries with different income levels.  
 
2. Panel threshold regression models 
Hansen (1999) proposes a non-dynamic panel threshold model to estimate the structural 
break point of the threshold value. Within an individual fixed effects model, observations fall 
into multiple regimes, depending on whether the observation is below, above, or between 
threshold values. These regimes are identified by varying regression slopes. The threshold 
value is determined endogenously by the data, and its statistical significance is assessed by the 
bootstrap method. The explanatory variables are assumed to be exogenous.  
A single threshold model is given as follows:                                                                   
                                 !!" = #! +	&΄#(!")(+!" ≤ -)	+ &΄$(!")(+!" > -)		+	0!"                     (1) 
where !!"	and +!" are the scalars standing for the dependent and threshold variable, 
respectively. Explanatory variables are denoted by (!", which is a k vector. I (.) is the indicator 
function, and γ is the threshold parameter dividing the sample into two regimes. Alternatively, 
model (1) can be written as: 
 
                                           git=1#! 	+ &΄#(!" + 0!"	, (+!" ≤ -)	#! + &΄$(!" + 034, (+!" > -)                                                 (2) 
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The main assumption for the identification of β1 and β2 concerns the fact that the 
components of xit and +!" are not time invariant. In addition, xit,	+!" and eit are assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d). The initial step is to eliminate fixed effects using 
within transformation, followed by estimating	- by the least squares estimation, and to 
establish the value minimising the concentrated sum of the squared errors to obtain the 
following: 
                                                             !"#$%&'()*!(!)!                                                            (3)                                                                                 
where S1(γ)=0̂∗(-)΄0̂∗(-)=Y*΄(I-X*(γ)΄(X*(γ)΄X(γ))-1X*(γ)΄)Y* and I denotes the identity matrix. 
After obtaining	-6, residual vector 0̂∗=0̂∗(-) and residual variance	σ8$ =#'()*#) 0̂∗΄0̂∗= #'()*#) 9#(-6) are computed. 
In order to test the significance of the threshold effect, the hypothesis of no threshold 
(i.e. H0:β1=β2) is tested using the likelihood ratio of F1=(S0-9#(-6))/:6$ (S0 is the sum of squared 
residuals for a no threshold case) having a non-standard distribution. A bootstrap procedure is 
implemented, in order to obtain a first order asymptotic distribution, in which the valid p values 
are constructed. If the null is rejected, a further test can be conducted, in order to distinguish 
between one and two thresholds, based on the likelihood ratio F2= (9#(-6#)-9$(-6$,))/:6$ of one 
versus two thresholds, which can be repeated to test for more than two threshold cases.  
3. Financial inclusion and income inequality: A panel threshold analysis 
We investigate the relationship between financial inclusion and income inequality using 
a balanced panel of 106 developed and developing countries for 2011, 2014 and 2017. The 
equation of interest with one potential threshold γ takes the following form:         
            3;0<=>?34@!" = #! +	&΄#A3!")(+!" ≤ -)	+ &΄$(!")(A3!" > -)		+ BC!"	+	0!"             (4) 
where I (.) is the indicator function and the threshold variable αit divides the observations into 
two different regimes, characterised by two different slopes β1 and β2. The dependent variable 
is income inequality, which is measured by the  Gini coefficient of disposable  income
1.
 
1  Data on financial inclusion were obtained from the Global Findex database. All the other data were collected from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database.  
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 The financial inclusion variable fi serves as the regime-dependent regressor and threshold 
variable. The parameters β1 and β2 correspond to the effect of financial inclusion on inequality 
in the low and high regime, respectively. We use two different measures of financial inclusion 
that capture the “access” and “use” dimensions of an inclusive financial system, namely: (1) 
the percentage of the adult population having an account at a formal financial institution and 
(2) the percentage of adults borrowing from a formal institution. W represents a set of regime-
independent regressors that are often used as control variables in the financial inclusion-
inequality literature, including trade, inflation, government spending, education and population 
growth (e.g., Park and Mercado, 2018). Finally, μi is a country fixed effect, and eit the error 
term.  We also control for potential endogeneity 2   . 
 Table 1 reports the results of estimating Eq. (4) using these two different measures of 
financial inclusion for the whole sample and for the sub-samples of high-, middle-, and low-
income countries. The upper panel shows that the null hypothesis of no threshold can be 
rejected at the 5% significance level, while the alternative hypothesis of a single threshold can 
be accepted.   
 Our results indicate that financial inclusion has a non-linear effect on income inequality. 
Furthermore, the impact of financial inclusion on inequality varies with the type of financial 
service, as well as with the level of economic development. The analysis of the two regime-
dependent financial inclusion coefficients β1 and β2 show that account ownership has a 
significant negative effect on income inequality only up to a certain point, beyond which this 
effect becomes insignificant in most cases. The threshold estimates, denoted by γ, range from 
29.177 (low-income countries) to 62.144 (high-income countries). This indicates that the 
threshold beyond which an increase in account ownership no longer results in a reduction in 
income inequality is reached when 29%, 30% and 62% of adults in low-, middle- and high-
income countries, respectively, have an account at a formal institution. One possible 
explanation for this is related to the access-use gap in financial inclusion. Globally, 20% of 
account owners do not make use of the savings and payments services their accounts provide. 
This share is especially high in many low- and lower-middle- income countries, such as Nepal 
and India (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2018).   
 We also find that increases in borrowing are associated with decreases in income 
inequality but only up to a certain threshold level of borrowing. Beyond that level, further 
 
2 To control for potential endogeneity in our model, we regress financial inclusion on a set of instruments identified in the finance-inequality 
literature, and use the predicted values in our estimation. Specifically, the set of instruments we identified from the literature are a country’s 
legal origins and the quality of institutions, in line with Mookerjee and Kalipioni (2010).  
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increases in borrowing lead to increases in inequality in all countries, and especially in low- 
and middle-income countries. The point beyond which the use of formal credit increases 
income inequality is reached when 6.9%, 6.8% and 10.6% of the adult population borrow from 
formal institutions in low-, middle- and high-income countries, respectively. This finding 
implies that promoting financial inclusion through credit may cause financial instability and 
thereby worsen income inequality. For example, microcredit may adversely affect the poor by 
causing over-indebtedness. 
 
4. Conclusion  
We provide new evidence of a non-linear, U-shaped relationship between financial 
inclusion and income inequality. The effects of financial inclusion on income distribution 
depend on a country’s level of financial inclusion and economic development, as well as the 
types of financial inclusion policies adopted (i.e., credit-based or otherwise). Overall, the more 
financial inclusion a country achieves, the greater the reduction in income inequality; however, 
this holds true at lower levels of financial inclusion. At higher levels of financial inclusion, for 
heterogeneous types of financial products, and for low- and middle-income countries, more 
financial inclusion may not deliver better outcomes in terms of income inequality reduction. 
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Table 1 
The financial inclusion-income inequality nexus. 
 Financial inclusion: Account (Access) Financial Inclusion: Borrowing (Use) 
Variables (Whole 
sample) 
(High  
Income) 
(Middle  
Income) 
(Low  
Income) 
(Whole 
sample) 
(High 
Income) 
(Middle 
Income) 
(Low 
Income) 
Test for the number of thresholds         
H0: No threshold (K=0)   0.021 0.035 0.019 0.022   0.011 0.023 0.034 0.016 
H0: At most one threshold (K= 1)   0.140 0.450 0.170 0.336   0.123 0.132 0.223 0.154 
Threshold estimates and confidence 
intervals 
        γ"   31.319 62.144 30.329 29.177   6.840 10.569 6.840 6.880 
95% confidence interval 31.317-31.436 59.687-62.500 28.176-31.020 28.610-34.672 6.820-6.880 8.933-11.752 6.801-6.904 6.840-6.940 
Coefficients of Regime-dependent 
regressors 
        
β1 -0.091*** -0.021* -0.077** -0.059** -0.365** -0.109* -0.588* -0.241** 
 (0.031) (0.011) (0.034) (0.024) (0.177) (0.065) (0.327) (0.116) 
β2 0.016 0.008 0.038 0.146** 0.049* 0.005* 0.022* 0.131** 
 (0.019) (0.008) (0.045) (0.057) (0.029) (0.003) (0.014) (0.056) 
Regime-independent regressors         
Economic growth 0.037* 0.017* 0.131* 0.078 0.056* 0.021** 0.023 0.111* 
 (0.022) (0.009) (0.072) (0.062) (0.032) (0.009) (0.019) (0.062) 
School enrolment -0.008* -0.014** -0.020* -0.007* -0.012** 0.015 -0.017* -0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.010) (0.005) 
Trade -0.015* -0.009* -0.041* -0.031 -0.011* -0.011* -0.055 -0.031** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.022) (0.025) (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.015) 
Government expenditure -0.064* -0.087* 0.105* 0.071 -0.015 -0.012* 0.104* 0.014* 
 (0.039) (0.049) (0.67) (0.158) (0.013) (0.007) (0.055) (0.008) 
Inflation 0.005** 0.018 0.008 0.055 0.003* 0.011 0.011* 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.032) (0.036) (0.053) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) 
Population growth -0.197* -0.197 -5.214 -3.172 -0.111* -0.120* -0.102 -0.107* 
 (0.105) (0.385) (0.774) (0.705) (0.065) (0.067) (0.123) (0.060) 
Constant 43.074 37.327* 131.346 92.131 12.543 45.198* 56.103** 43.105* 
 (33.956) (22.312) (82.730) (63.123) (10.102) (33.302) (22.423) (22.506) 
Observations 318 114 75 129 318 114 75 129 
R-squared 0.133 0.203 0.190 0.200 0.213 0.198 0.202 0.204 
Number of id. 106 38 25 43 106 38 25 43 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses, */**/*** indicate the 10%/5%/1% significance levels. Like in Hansen (1999), each regime has to contain at least 5% of all observations. 1000 
bootstrap replications were used to obtain the p-values to test for the number of thresholds. By construction, the confidence intervals for the threshold estimates can be highly asymmetric.  
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